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ABSTRACT
Courts have consistently struggled to adopt a test that appropriately
interprets the Copyright Act’s language protecting works of art
incorporated into useful articles. The analysis that allows protections of
these works of art is called “separability,” and it has been an ambiguous
area of copyright law since its inception. In essence, this analysis gives
copyright protection to a work of art incorporated into a useful article as
long as the work of art is “separate” from the utilitarian aspects of the
useful article. The Supreme Court was positioned to end the uncertainty
surrounding the separability analysis in its recent decision, Star Athletica.
But a survey of lower court decisions applying Star Athletica’s new test
shows that it has significant shortcomings. The new analysis results in
overprotection of designs incorporated into useful articles and lacks
normative guidance. As a result, this Note first argues that Congress
should amend the copyright statute. But, if the test remains unchanged,
courts should proceed by analyzing these works of art in the following
way: the more difficult it is to separate the work of art from the utilitarian
aspects of the useful article, the “thinner” the copyright protection a court
should give to that work of art.
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INTRODUCTION
In March 2017, the Supreme Court resolved a split amongst lower
courts for the separability analysis.1 In Star Athletica v. Varsity Brands,
the Court announced a new test that departed from the nine previous tests
applied by lower courts.2 The separability analysis is used when copyright
protection is sought for works of art incorporated into useful articles.3 It
allows for certain works of art to gain copyright protection, despite the fact
that those works are part of useful articles that are not themselves protected
through copyright.4 For example, this test is particularly important because
of its implications for the copyrights of designs on clothing.5 The fashion
industry has consistently pushed for an expansion of copyrights in order
to preserve and incentivize creativity6 with the practical goal of gaining
greater protection to stop the frequent copying of fashion designs.7 Thus,
the test announced by the Court may have far-reaching consequences for
copyrights in certain industries, like the fashion industry, where designs
are commonly incorporated into useful articles.
1. See Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017).
2. Id. at 1005.
3. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
4. See id. (discussing the definitions of “useful articles” and “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works”).
5. Clothing falls under the definition of “useful article” because of its “intrinsic utilitarian
function.” Id.; see also Amy L. Landers, The Anti-Economy of Fashion; An Openwork Approach to
Intellectual Property Protection, 24 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 427, 428 (2014)
(citing U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 40: COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION FOR PICTORIAL,
GRAPHIC, AND SCULPTURAL WORKS (2015), http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ40.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/7K9B-ABNZ]).
6. David E. Shipley, All for Copyright Stand Up and Holler! Three Cheers for Star Athletica and
the U.S. Supreme Court’s Perceived and Imagined Separately Test, 36 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
149, 165 (2018). But see Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and
Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1690 (2006).
7. Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct.
1002 (2017) (No. 15-866) (“Justice Sotomayor: You’re killing . . . knock-offs with . . . copyright. You
haven’t been able to do it with trademark law. You haven’t been able to do it with patent designs. We
are now going to use copyright law to kill the . . . knockoff industry. I don’t know that that’s bad. I’m
just saying.”). Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. L. REV.
809, 817 (2010); Landers, supra note 5, at 428.
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This Note will consider the successes and struggles of lower courts
in applying the new test subsequent to the decision in Star Athletica. In
light of these cases, this Note argues that the new test announced in Star
Athletica inadequately resolved the disparate tests by focusing on the
abstract text of the Copyright Act. Lower courts’ application of this new,
ambiguous standard reveals overprotection of useful articles based on a
reliance on originality as a limit to protection. Moreover, courts have
struggled with the departure from old tests, especially with the role of
functionality in the analysis.
Part I of this Note will conceptualize the various modern tests in the
context and history of the Copyright Act. Part II of this Note will frame
the abstract separability analysis in the context of the fashion industry, an
industry replete with imitation. Part III of this Note will survey lower court
applications of the new standard in order to locate the reasons for
confusion and overprotection in application. Finally, Part IV argues that a
solution to this problem should include one of two things: (1) an
amendment to the separability section of the Copyright Act that utilizes all
or some of the nine tests the lower courts used, which will aid in creating
a clearer statutory standard or (2) a thin copyright protection for useful
articles under the Star Athletica separability standard.
I. SEPARABILITY IN THE COPYRIGHT ACT: HISTORY AND CONTEXT
Before jumping into the details of the separability analysis, it is
important to consider the origins of separability. The separability analysis
was prompted by a case decided twenty years prior to the 1976 Copyright
Act, which provides the modern framework for copyright law.8 In Mazer
v. Stein, the Court interpreted the 1909 Copyright Act to extend copyright
protection to a sculpture of a dancer that was a part of a lamp.9 The Court
held that the fact that the dancer was incorporated into the lamp did not
change the ability of the sculptural work to obtain copyright protection,
even though patent protection is supposed to sufficiently cover useful
articles.10 The Court’s interpretation of the Act was supported by
regulations of the Copyright Office.11 Subsequently, the Copyright Office

8. See generally Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
9. Id. at 213–15.
10. Id. at 217; see also Jane C. Ginsburg, “Courts Have Twisted Themselves into Knots”: US
Copyright Protection for Applied Art, 40 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 2 (2016); Viva R. Moffat, The
Copyright/Patent Boundary, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 611, 611 (2014).
11. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 212–14. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.8(a) (1949) (extending protection to “works
of artistic craftsmanship, in so far as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are
concerned”); Case Comment, Copyright Act of 1976—Useful Articles—Star Athletica, L.L.C. v.
Varsity Brands, Inc., 131 HARV. L. REV. 363, 367 (2017) [hereinafter Harv. Case Comment].
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codified the Mazer holding into a regulation,12 which became the basis of
the separability analysis in the 1976 Copyright Act.13
Mazer provides the paradigmatic example of where Congress
intended to extend copyrights to works of art incorporated into useful
articles. The work of art incorporated into the useful article in that case
could be intuitively viewed as separate from the utilitarian aspects of the
useful article. Comparing Mazer to other cases can be a useful tool to
determine whether lower courts using Star Athletica’s separability
analysis significantly departs from the kind of protection Congress
intended to grant works of art incorporated into useful articles.
While Mazer was the impetus of separability in the Copyright Act of
1976, it is also essential to dig deeper into the words of the Act itself.14
Congress enacted this Act pursuant to its Constitutional power “[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.”15 While incentivizing creativity by granting
copyrights is a priority of the Act, the Act also explicitly excludes useful
articles from copyright protection.16 Useful articles are defined as
“article[s] having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to
portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.”17 The Act
goes even further in refusing to protect these articles through a clarification
of this definition: “An article that is normally a part of a useful article is
considered a ‘useful article.’”18 The reason that there is a lack of copyright
protection of useful articles is that patents, which grant protections to
inventions,19 normally cover such articles.20 But patent protection is harder
to obtain than copyright protection, and it does not last as long as copyright
protection.21

12. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1960).
13. Harv. Case Comment, supra note 11, at 367.
14. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
16. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) (defining “[p]ictorial, graphic, and sculptural works”).
17. Id. (defining a “useful article”).
18. Id.
19. Christopher A. Cotropia, What Is the “Invention”?, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1855, 1860
(2012).
20. Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that
copyright law was “never intended to nor would the Constitution permit them to protect monopolies
on useful articles”); Susan Scafidi, Intellectual Property and Fashion Design, in 1 INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH 115, 122 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2006) (explaining that such patents
for fashion design are impractical given the short timing of fashion).
21. Darren Hudson Hick, Conceptual Problems of Conceptual Separability and the NonUsefulness of the Useful Articles Distinction, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 37, 37 (2010). For an
in-depth discussion of the differences between patent and copyright law, see Steve W. Ackerman,
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Perhaps as a result of these differences, and with Mazer in mind, the
Act also allows for protection of “‘[p]ictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works’ [that] include two-dimensional and three-dimensional” works of
art.22 More particularly and most importantly here, while the Act does not
protect parts of useful articles that serve a utilitarian function,23 it protects
“the design of a useful article . . . only if, and only to the extent that, such
design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be
identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of,
the utilitarian aspects of the article.”24 This is the “separability” analysis—
the section of the Act that codified the ability to protect specific parts of
useful articles announced in Mazer. Even though the codification of Mazer
in the statute seems relatively straightforward, the Act itself is not clear as
to what it means to “be identified separately from” or exist “independently
of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.”25
The only clue regarding the application of separability based on the
language of the Act is from the House Committee on the Judiciary. The
Committee attempted to provide clarity by stating that a work of art could
be protected if it could be either physically or conceptually separated from
the useful article.26 Courts have interpreted physical separability to mean
that the work of art can be “physically separated from the article by
ordinary means while leaving the utilitarian aspects of the article
completely intact.”27 If the work of art could not be physically separated,
then it could still be protected as long as it could be imagined or visualized
as separate from the useful article while leaving the useful article intact.28
This is called “conceptual” separability.29 Without more guidance on the
Note, Protection of the Design of Useful Articles: Current Inadequacies and Proposed Solutions, 11
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1043, 1045 (1983).
22. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
23. See id.
24. Id.
25. See id.
26. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55 (1976) (“Unless the shape of an automobile, airplane, ladies’
dress, food processor, television set, or any other industrial product contains some element that,
physically or conceptually, can be identified as separable from the utilitarian aspects of that article,
the design would not be copyrighted under the bill.”). For more on the distinction between physical
and conceptual separability, see generally Barton R. Keyes, Alive and Well: The (Still) Ongoing
Debate Surrounding Conceptual Separability in American Copyright Law, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 109, 120
(2008) and Shira Perlmutter, Conceptual Separability and Copyright in the Designs of Useful Articles,
37 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 339 (1990).
27. Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1014 (2017) (citing U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 924.2(A) (3d ed. 2014)).
28. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 924.2(B)
(3d ed. 2014).
29. Id. Justice Breyer gave helpful guidance on the distinction between physical and conceptual
separability in his dissent in Star Athletica. 137 S. Ct. at 1031–32 (Breyer, J., dissenting). For an
example of physical separability, he used a lamp with a cat fixed on the round base of the lamp. Id. In
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separability analysis, courts were tasked with creating meaningful
standards that reflected Congress’s intentions in this section of the Act.
But the abstract textual requirement and vague guidance for the analysis
resulted in a variance of separability standards applied in the lower
courts.30 Lower courts have used nine different tests in grappling with
faithfully applying separability, some of which will be discussed in detail
later in the article.31
To summarize, when a party seeks copyright protection of a work of
art incorporated into a useful article, the Act requires a court to (1)
determine whether there is a valid copyright for the pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural work incorporated into the useful article32 and (2) utilize the
separability analysis to establish whether the work of art can be
sufficiently separated from the useful article.33
But if separability is met, it only establishes that the author has
ownership of a valid copyright in the work. If an author wants to enforce
his or her copyright, there is also a two-part infringement component.34
First, the author must show that the alleged infringer copied the author’s
work, which requires showing that the infringing work copied the original
elements of the work35 and evidence that the infringer actually copied the
work.36 The second element is improper appropriation, and it asks whether
the defendant’s copying was sufficient to constitute improper copying.37
While different tests for improper appropriation have been articulated, at
that case, the cat could be “physically separate from the lamp, as it could be easily removed while
leaving both cat and lamp intact.” Id. at 1032. For an example of conceptual separability, Justice
Breyer changes his hypothetical lamp to mirror the lamp in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954). Id.
The cat sculpture is placed in the middle of the base of the lamp with wires running through it. Id.
Because the cat sculpture and the lamp were “integrated into a single functional object,” the cat could
not be physically removed from the lamp without destroying the lamp and the cat. Id. But because the
cat can easily be imagined as separate from the lamp, the cat was conceptually separable from the
lamp like the dance sculptures in Mazer. Id.
30. Jacqueline Lefebvre, Note, The Need for “Supreme” Clarity: Clothing, Copyright, and
Conceptual Separability, 27 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 143, 179 (2016); Bill
Donahue, In Cheerleader Case, Justices Could Clean Up Fashion “Mess,” LAW360 (Apr. 14,
2016), http://www.law360.com/articles/784087/in-cheerleader-case-justices-could-clean-up-fashionmess.
31. Kristy Diesner, Note, Useful Article or Creative Design: Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star
Athletica, LLC, 27 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 91, 96–97 (2016); Alexandra Spina,
Case Comment, Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 61 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 239, 244 n.41
(2017) (citing the Sixth Circuit’s decision, Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, L.L.C., 799 F.3d
468, 484–85 (6th Cir. 2015)).
32. Kaitlin Chandler, Note, Bring It On: Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc. Redefines
Separability One Uniform Design at a Time, 20 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 225, 226 (2017).
33. Id.
34. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
35. MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 407–08 (4th ed. 2005).
36. Id. at 408–11.
37. Id. at 412.
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the simplest level, the plaintiff “must show that the defendant copied a
sufficient amount of the protectible elements of the plaintiff’s copyrighted
work as to render the two works substantially similar.”38 A main question
for a court regarding this element of a copyright claim, and a question
integral to this Note, is the requisite level of similarity between the
copyrighted work and the allegedly infringing work that will be considered
improper.39 In other words, depending on the kinds of works involved, a
court may require more or less similarity between the works before
concluding that a work is improperly infringing.
II. STAR ATHLETICA: FASHION AND REASONING
An example is helpful to conceptualize separability and its possible
implications. Aside from announcing the new separability test, the Star
Athletica case offers fashion as an example of why separability can be
significant.40 Historically, because clothing is considered a useful article,
Congress has refused to extend copyright protection to fashion designs on
clothing.41 But Star Athletica put this question squarely before the
Supreme Court and, through a test allowing designers to more easily
obtain copyrights for fashion designs, gave the fashion industry some hope
in realizing its goal of stopping the copying of designs.42 The case was
about the copyrightability of chevron designs printed onto cheerleading
uniforms.43 Because the designs were on useful articles, the Court was
tasked with a separability analysis to determine the copyrightability of the
designs.44
As a result of the split in the lower courts, the Court took up Star
Athletica to resolve the separability issue, and it announced a new test that

38. Id.
39. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Normativity of Copying in Copyright Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 203,
207 (2012).
40. Julie Zerbo, Protecting Fashion Designs: Not Only “What?” but “Who?,” 6 AM. U. BUS. L.
REV. 595, 597–98 (2017).
41. See Registrability of Costume Designs, 56 Fed. Reg. 56,530 (U.S. Copyright Office Nov. 5,
1991); Jonathan M. Barnett et al., The Fashion Lottery: Cooperative Innovation in Stochastic Markets,
39 J. LEGAL STUD. 159, 163–64 (2010).
42. See Helene M. Freeman, A Big Cheer for Cheerleader Uniforms, FASHION INDUSTRY L.
BLOG (Mar. 22, 2017), https://fashionindustrylaw.com/2017/03/22/a-big-cheer-for-cheerleaderuniforms/ [https://perma.cc/T9T9-73CG]; Michael Madison, Two Cheers for Copyright,
MADISONIAN (Mar. 27, 2017), http://madisonian.net/2017/03/27/two-cheers-for-copyright/
[https://perma.cc/BA7U-8L7S]; Steff Yotka, What the Supreme Court’s First Ruling on Fashion
Copyrights Means for the Runway, VOGUE (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.vogue.com/article/supremecourt-star-athletica-varsity-brands-ruling-fashion-industry [https://perma.cc/B328-EMP5].
43. Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1004 (2017).
44. Id. at 1004–05.
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ended the debate as to which of the nine separability tests the lower courts
should use.45 The Court created its own test:
We hold that a feature incorporated into the design of a useful article
is eligible for copyright protection only if the feature (1) can be
perceived as a two- or three-dimensional work of art separate from
the useful article and (2) would qualify as a protectable pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural work—either on its own or fixed in some other
tangible medium of expression—if it were imagined separately from
the useful article into which it is incorporated.46

The Court, applying its new test for separability—which closely
followed the text of the Copyright Act—held that the chevron designs (1)
could be imagined separately from the cheerleading uniforms and (2)
could have qualified as a protectable work when imagined separately from
the design.47
In describing its analysis, the Court noted that “[t]he first
requirement—separate identification—is not onerous” because one “need
only be able to look at the useful article and spot some two- or threedimensional element that appears to have pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
qualities.”48 By choosing to focus on imagining the work of art separated
from the useful article, the Court chose “conceptual” separability as the
standard and explicitly eliminated the previous distinction between
“physical” and “conceptual” separability announced by the House
Committee on the Judiciary.49
The Court went on to comment that “[t]he independent-existence
requirement is ordinarily more difficult to satisfy,”50 reasoning that this
second requirement means that “the feature must be able to exist as its own
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work . . . once it is imagined apart from the
useful article.”51 The Court highlighted that this requirement in itself
provided a sufficient analytical tool for determining whether the work of
art served a functional purpose in the useful article: “If the feature is not
capable of existing as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work once
separated from the useful article, then it was . . . one of its utilitarian
aspects” that was not protectable under the Act.52
45. Id. at 1007.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1010.
49. Id. at 1014 (“[W]e necessarily abandon the distinction between ‘physical’ and ‘conceptual’
separability, which some courts and commentators have adopted based on the Copyright Act’s
legislative history.”).
50. Id. at 1010.
51. Id. at 1005.
52. Id. at 1010.
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This reasoning appears to disregard prior separability tests that more
carefully analyzed whether the work of art performed a utilitarian function.
More specifically, the Court explicitly clarified that it did not consider
“any aspects of the useful article that remain after the imaginary
extraction[,]” and it instead focused on the work of art separated from the
article.53 This reasoning eliminated the need to analyze the functionality
of the useful article after the design was removed, which was one notable
test that some circuits previously adopted.54 The Court also unequivocally
rejected two other tests previously used by lower courts: “(1) ‘[W]hether
the design elements can be identified as reflecting the designer’s artistic
judgment exercised independently of functional influence[;]’ and (2)
whether ‘there is [a] substantial likelihood that the pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural feature would still be marketable to some significant segment
of the community without its utilitarian function[.]’”55 The Court rejected
these tests because neither of them were rooted in the statute.56
Since Star Athletica was decided, lower courts have focused on the
Court’s example of a tangible medium in which the chevron designs could
exist when imagined separately from the useful article: “a painter’s
canvas.”57 While Justice Thomas worked hard to explain that this is an
acceptable way to think about separability, the dissent was skeptical that
this would merely create “pictures of cheerleader uniforms.”58
Nonetheless, Justice Thomas’s interpretation won out; the test for
separability is now rooted in the abstract language of the Copyright Act.
III. LOWER COURT APPLICATIONS
After Star Athletica, only a handful of cases have applied the new
test in depth. Three general categories of cases emerge from a survey of
these lower court decisions: (1) cases with facts that lend themselves to
intuitive separability; (2) cases that result in overprotection of useful
articles due to a reliance on originality as a limiting factor; and (3) cases
struggling with the role of functionality in the new separability test.
A. Intuitive Separability
Some cases have provided notably easy separability analyses after
Star Athletica because of their facts. In these cases, courts can intuitively
53. Id. at 1013.
54. Id. at 1014 (“But the statute does not require the imagined remainder to be a fully functioning
useful article at all, much less an equally useful one.”).
55. Id. at 1015 (citation omitted) (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 34–35).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1012. For an example of this approach, see Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods.,
Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 934 (7th Cir. 2004) (Kanne, J., dissenting).
58. Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1030–31 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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separate certain pictorial, graphic, or sculptural elements from useful
articles that are worthy of copyright protection. These cases had little
difficulty in applying the separability analysis, so it is helpful to see where
Star Athletica has been applied to contextualize the analytical problems in
other cases.
For example, in Design Ideas, Ltd. v. Meijer, Inc., the plaintiff
brought a copyright infringement suit for the copying of its “Sparrow
Clips,” comprised of a sparrow figure placed on a clothespin.59 In
determining whether the sparrow figure was copyrightable, the court
initially and very easily held that, regarding the first separability
requirement, the bird could be imagined as a three-dimensional work of
art separate from the clothespin.60 The court proceeded to hold that the bird
would be a copyrightable sculptural work of art when separated from the
clothespin and placed into another tangible medium.61 In its reasoning for
this second requirement, the court noted that the sparrow figure was not
“useful” merely because it could be used in insignificant or trivial useful
ways once removed from the useful article (like hanging the bird from its
beak or using the bird as a door stop).62 Instead, the sparrow on the
clothespin had to have “an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely
to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information” to be
useful and thus not protectable.63
In another case, Triangl Group Ltd. v. Jiangmen City Xinhui District
Lingzhi Garment Co., the plaintiff asserted copyrights in their distinctive
swimsuit line with a black trim in a “T” shape.64 The court directly
analogized these facts to Star Athletica and stated that the “black trim and
T-shape” of the swimsuit could be imagined separately from clothing and
could exist as their own works of art in another tangible medium.65
Both of these cases give good examples of the straightforward
application of Star Athletica when there is an identifiable work of art that
is intuitively separable from a useful article. In Design Ideas, a threedimensional sparrow on a clothespin is relatively easy to imagine as
separate from the clothespin and existing as its own sculptural work in
another medium.66 These facts are very similar to Mazer in that the bird,
59. Design Ideas, Ltd. v. Meijer, Inc., No. 15-cv-03093, 2017 WL 2662473, at *1 (C.D. Ill. June
20, 2017).
60. Id. at *2.
61. Id. at *3.
62. Id.
63. Id. at *1 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010)).
64. Triangl Grp. Ltd. v. Jiangmen City Xinhui Dist. Lingzhi Garment Co., No. 16 Civ. 1498
PGG, 2017 WL 2829752, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2017).
65. Id. at *8
66. Design Ideas, Ltd., 2017 WL 2662473, at *2.

2020]

Thin Separability

1097

like the sculpture of a dancer on the lamp, was separable from the
clothespin and naturally viewed as an artistic statue in its own right, rather
than being a utilitarian part of the clothespin.67 The Triangl Group case
offered a similarly easy separability analysis because it concerned shapes
and designs on a commonly used fashion item, which were plainly
separable under Star Athletica’s holding.68
B. Overprotection and Originality
Other cases have useful articles and designs that stray further from
cases like Mazer and Star Athletica, which make the separability analysis
much more demanding. These cases start to expose some of the
complications and the lack of guidance from Star Athletica’s analysis. In
one category of challenges, courts only rely on originality to limit broad
applications of the new separability analysis. A work must be original in
order to be eligible for copyright protection.69 Originality requires that
both authorship and creativity be manifested in the work in question,70 but
the amount of creativity necessary is considered “extremely low.”71 While
courts are not overtly struggling with overprotection, using originality as
a limiting factor once separability is met leads to overprotection of useful
articles. The following cases provide some examples.
In one case, Silvertop Associates, Inc. v. Kangaroo Manufacturing,
Inc., the plaintiff asserted copyrights to the combination of designs
incorporated into a banana suit.72 In granting a preliminary injunction, the
district court held that almost every feature of the banana suit was probably
protected except for the arm holes.73 According to the court, the cutout
holes of the suit were merely an unprotectable utilitarian part of the suit
because “[t]hey do not contribute to the Banana Costume’s aesthetic
except to produce it in a wearable form.”74 However, almost the rest of the
entire suit was protected under the separability analysis.75 The court’s
framing of this analysis is significant to its outcome: “The Court must view
the Banana Costume as a whole, as opposed to inspecting the individual
67. Id. at *2–3. See generally Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
68. Triangl Grp. Ltd., 2017 WL 2829752, at *8.
69. Katherine L. McDaniel & James Juo, A Quantum of Originality in Copyright, 8 CHI.-KENT
J. INTELL. PROP 169, 169 (2009).
70. David E. Shipley, Thin but Not Anorexic: Copyright Protection for Compilations and Other
Fact Works, 15 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 91, 92 (2007).
71. Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
72. Silvertop Assocs., Inc. v. Kangaroo Mfg., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 3d 754, 760 (D.N.J. 2018), aff'd,
931 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2019).
73. Id. at 764.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 764–65.
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components that come together to create the Banana Costume.”76 The
court went on to state that the banana suit’s features comprised as a whole,
many of which are suspect as utilitarian parts of any costume,77 could be
“identified separately from and can exist independently from the utilitarian
aspect of the article.”78 Perhaps most interestingly, the court stated that “if
these features were separated from the costume itself and applied on a
painter’s canvas, it would qualify as a two-dimensional work of art.”79
Relying heavily on a “painter’s canvas” as a primary means of legal
analysis, the court held that the compilation of the banana suit’s colors,
shapes, and textures could together be protected because the “imaginative
spark” of the unique combination of its parts provided the requisite level
of creativity for originality.80 The court came to this conclusion despite the
fact that the banana suit depicted a natural object and was “unlikely to end
up in the Philadelphia Museum of Art.”81
This decision was recently affirmed by the Third Circuit.82 The Third
Circuit agreed that the Banana Costume contained artistic features
(“colors, lines, shape, and length”) that were separable and capable of
existing independently of the useful article.83 The court also agreed that
the costume’s holes were not protectable because they were a utilitarian
part of the costume.84 The Third Circuit explained that it could “imagine
the banana apart from the costume as an original sculpture” and that the
“sculpted banana, once split from the costume, is not intrinsically
utilitarian and does not merely replicate the costume.”85 Moreover, the
court confirmed that Star Athletica allowed the artistic features of the
76. Id. at 764.
77. The court identified the following as protectable:
a) the overall length of the costume, b) the overall shape of the design in terms of curvature,
c) the length of the shape both above and below the torso of the wearer, d) the shape, size,
and jet black color of both ends, e) the location of the head and arm cutouts which dictate
how the costume drapes on and protrudes from a wearer (as opposed to the mere existence
of the cutout holes), f) the soft, smooth, almost shiny look and feel of the chosen synthetic
fabric, g) the parallel lines which mimic the ridges on a banana in three-dimensional form,
and h) the bright shade of a golden yellow and uniform color that appears distinct from the
more muted and inconsistent tones of a natural banana.
Id. at 764–65.
78. Id. at 764.
79. Id. at 765.
80. Id. It is also worth noting that the court contrasted the banana costume with the iconic
cheerleading outfit in Star Athletica. While the chevron designs on the outfit were protectable, the
court noted that the cheerleading uniform itself would not be protectable because it was an iconic and
common outfit that necessitated no level of originality on its own. Id.
81. Id. at 765.
82. Silvertop Assocs., Inc. v. Kangaroo Mfg., Inc., 931 F.3d 215, 218 (3d Cir. 2019).
83. Id. at 221.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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costume to be analyzed in combination.86 The court again rejected the
argument that the banana costume was unoriginal because the banana suit
depicted a natural object.87 It emphasized that the argument “seeks to raise
the originality requirement’s very low bar”88 and held that “the depiction
of the natural object has a minimal level of creativity” to be
copyrightable.89 Last, the court rejected the infringer’s analogy to another
case in which the court held that a costume was not original because the
costume was merely a pile of fabric when imagined separately from the
wearer.90 The court underscored that Star Athletica no longer permitted
such an approach because it required the expressive features to be
imagined and fixed in a “tangible medium.”91 Thus, while the court did
not specifically use the “painter’s canvas” in its analysis, it confirmed that
the district court’s use of that mode of analysis was proper
after Star Athletica.
In another case, Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., the plaintiff
sued for the copyrights to the designs of hookah water containers.92 The
court concluded that plaintiffs failed to identify the separate parts of the
hookah containers that could be the predicate for the Star Athletica
analysis.93 The issue was that the plaintiff sought protection of the way the
shapes were combined to form the entire container.94 The court explained
that “[w]hen an entity seeks protection for the arrangement of all the parts
of an article, combined in the manner necessary to create the article, it is
effectively seeking protection for the article as a whole.”95 Because such
comprehensive protection of useful articles is not permissible, the court
held that the plaintiff did not point to artistic features of the containers that
were separable from the usefulness of the article itself.96 The court
attempted to identify individual or subsets of shapes that could be works
of art separated from the container.97 However, the court highlighted that
the container was a combination of common geometric shapes that were
86. The court noted that Star Athletica took into account “the arrangement of colors, shapes,
stripes, and chevrons on the surface of the cheerleading uniforms.” Id. (quoting Star Athletica, L.L.C.
v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1012 (2017)).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 222.
90. Id.
91. Id. (citing Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1012).
92. Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-03838-ODW (FFM), 2017 WL 4163990,
at *1 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2017).
93. Id. at *2.
94. See id. at *3.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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not sufficiently unique to be passable as original sculptural works.98
Nevertheless, the court qualified that some unique combinations of
geometric shapes could be sufficiently original after Star Athletica.99 The
court, however, concluded that “the water container at issue here is no
Noguchi Table.”100
In Glass Egg Digital Media v. Gameloft, Inc., the plaintiff asserted
copyrights to certain arrangements of polygons in 3D digital car models
used in the defendant’s video games.101 The plaintiff claimed that its
arrangements of the polygons were copyrightable because they were
sufficiently original and because they could be separated from the cars as
they appeared on the screen.102 The court assumed that the polygon
arrangements were separable from the cars because the defendant did not
contest that fact.103 Because separability was met, the court was left only
to consider whether these arrangements possessed the required level of
originality.104 Unlike Inhale, where the polygons did not meet the required
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. A Noguchi table is a modern table that creatively utilizes shapes in its design. The
court used the table’s creative design as an example of how a configuration of shapes can possess the
requisite level of originality and how the shapes of the water container did not remotely represent
such creativity. The court included a picture of a Noguchi table at this part of the opinion, and below
appears another example:

Noguchi Table, DESIGN WITHIN REACH, https://www.dwr.com/living-accent-coffee-tables/noguchitable/6115.html?lang=en_US [https://perma.cc/KP5K-KTYE].
101. Glass Egg Dig. Media v. Gameloft, Inc., No. 17-cv-04165-MMC, 2018 WL 3659259, at *4
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2018).
102. Id.
103. See id. at *5.
104. See id.
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level of originality, the court held that the decisions made by artists
working for the plaintiff on where to put the large amount of polygons
based on millions of combinations possessed the minimal, requisite degree
of creativity.105
All three of these examples, in one way or another, show the
extension of the copyrightability of useful articles after Star Athletica
because originality appears as the only limiting factor to a broad
separability analysis. In Silvertop, the court decided that almost an entire
banana suit was probably protected because the suit was comprised of a
unique combination of various parts.106 The court was allowed the freedom
to deem those combinations as original after it applied the new and less
stringent separability analysis.107 Both the district court and the Third
Circuit were able to conclude that the banana suit was separable because
it could exist in another tangible medium.108 This arguably confirms the
dissent’s worry in Star Athletica that the new separability analysis
would allow for copyrightability by creating “pictures” of the work of
art in question.109
Moreover, the overprotection resulting from this new analysis is
apparent when looking at how far Silvertop takes us from Mazer. As
previously discussed, the dancer incorporated into the lamp in Mazer is
relatively easy to see as a piece of art separable from a lamp as a useful
article.110 However, in Silvertop, it is more difficult to see how a banana
suit’s “artistic” shape and length are separable from the whole suit as a
useful article.111 Thus, because of its focus on the originality of the
combination of artistic parts in the suit, Silvertop shows that the new
analysis may provide copyright protection in cases where it is not clear
whether the artistic parts of the useful article are separable from the
article’s usefulness.
The issue of originality as a limiting factor is also more clearly shown
in a comparison between Inhale and Glass Egg. The court in Inhale, while
noting that it was an easy case, drew the line between what was not a
protectable arrangement of geometrical figures—the hookah containers—
105. Id.
106. Silvertop Assocs., Inc. v. Kangaroo Mfg., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 3d 754, 765 (D.N.J. 2018),
aff’d, 931 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2019).
107. For cases before Star Athletica that protected costumes, see Masquerade Novelty, Inc. v.
Unique Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 663, 671 (3d Cir. 1990) and Nat’l Theme Prods., Inc. v. Jerry B. Beck,
Inc., 696 F. Supp. 1348, 1356 (S.D. Cal. 1988).
108. Silvertop Assocs., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 3d at 765; Silvertop Assocs., Inc. v. Kangaroo Mfg.,
Inc., 931 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir. 2019).
109. Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1030–31 (2017) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
110. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 202, 212–14 (1954).
111. See Silvertop Assocs., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 3d at 764–65.
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and a protectable arrangement that was—a Noguchi table—based on the
originality of the composition rather than on the separability of such
arrangements.112 Although originality limited the copyrights of the
common polygon hookah containers in Inhale,113 there was no such limit
to the more complex car models in Glass Egg.114 Originality appears to be
the only difference in the result between the two cases. If originality is the
only limit to the new separability analysis, then it is likely correct that the
new analysis will extend protection to artistic parts of useful articles
beyond what Congress intended.115 Originality is a low bar in copyrights,
and it is not an effective limiting factor to a broadened separability
analysis.116 It seems that the copyright community has already noted the
possibility of overprotection of designs on useful articles as there has been
a notable increase in copyright litigation after Star Athletica.117
C. Functionality
In another category of challenges, courts struggle with the role of
functionality in determining whether the work of art can exist separately
from the useful article.118 Notably, the Court in Star Athletica rejected both
a meaningful analysis of the functionality of the useful article after the
expressive feature is separated, as well as whether the design of the work
of art reflected any functional influence.119 Both of these tests were
previously used by courts for the separability analysis.120 The role of
functionality in the separability analysis has caused some tension in the
following cases.

112. Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-03838-ODW (FFM), 2017 WL
4163990, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2017).
113. Id.
114. See Glass Egg Dig. Media v. Gameloft, Inc., No. 17-cv-04165-MMC, 2018 WL 3659259,
at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2018).
115. Lili Levi, The New Separability, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 709, 712–14 (2018).
116. See generally McDaniel & Juo, supra note 69; Joseph Scott Miller, Hoisting Originality,
31 CARDOZO L. REV. 451 (2009).
117. See McDaniel & Juo, supra note 69. See, e.g., Puma Files Patent, Copyright, Trade Dress
Suit Against Forever 21 Over Rihanna Shoes, FASHION L. (Apr. 3, 2017), http://www.thefashion
law.com/home/puma-files-design-patent-copyright-trade-dress-suit-against-forever-21-over-rihannafootwear [https://perma.cc/M8KB-BB6F] [hereinafter Puma Files Patent, Copyright, Trade Dress
Suit].
118. For an in-depth discussion of the confusion of the role of functionality in the separability
analysis in Star Athletica, see generally Christopher Buccafusco & Jeanne C. Fromer, Forgetting
Functionality, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 119 (2017); see also Rebecca Tushnet, Shoveling a Path After Star
Athletica, 66 UCLA L. REV. 1216, 1224–31 (2019).
119. Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1013, 1015 (2017).
120. Larry C. Russ & Nathan D. Meyer, Fashion Forward: The Star Athletica v. Varsity Brands
Decision Overturned Copyright Office Practices Going Back Half a Century, L.A. LAW., Sept. 2017,
at 20, 23–24.
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In Jetmax Ltd. v. Big Lots, Inc., the plaintiff sued to enforce its
copyrights to a teardrop light set that had ornamental features, including
“molded, decorative tear shaped covered lights with a wire frame over the
covers.”121 With regard to the first requirement of separability, the court
held that the decorative molding of the lights could be identified separately
from the utilitarian use of the light set.122 The court reasoned that the
second requirement for separability was also met because the decorative
covers were artistic, sculptural works that could be removed from the light
set and stand apart from the functionality of the light set.123 This analysis
seems straightforward. But the court also clarified that, even though the
light covers served a useful purpose by creating less glare, it was irrelevant
whether the useful article was equally functional once the separated part
was removed after Star Athletica.124
In Ross v. Apple, Inc., the plaintiff asserted copyrights of his drawing
that he claimed Apple had stolen from him through the “non-functional
aesthetic look and feel” of the drawings.125 The court, however, disagreed
and stated that the parts of the drawing were not separable from “the idea
of a handheld electronic reading device.”126 Thus, the court held that none
of the elements of the drawing could be perceived as a work of art that was
separate from the usefulness of the device itself.127 Instead, the court stated
that these were “necessary parts of [the device,]”128 which is a nod toward
a previous separability test that emphasized the functionality of the work
of art for the useful article.129 It is unclear whether Star Athletica
abandoned that test specifically, but this court does appear to rely on it in
part when applying the new test.
After Star Athletica, the Court instructed that functionality (i.e., the
utilitarian aspects of the useful article) was considered only when deciding
whether the work of art could “exist apart from the utilitarian aspects of
the article.”130 Thus, the focus of this analysis is simply on the ability of
the work of art to exist in another tangible medium. The Court circularly
concluded that, as long as the work of art could exist separately, then it
121. Jetmax Ltd. v. Big Lots, Inc., No. 15-cv-9597 (KBF), 2017 WL 3726756, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 28, 2017).
122. Id. at *6.
123. Id.
124. Id. at n.2.
125. Ross v. Apple, Inc., 741 F. App’x 733, 734 (11th Cir. 2018).
126. Id. at 737.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. This separability test was called “the objectively necessary approach, which provides that
‘if the artistic features of the design are not necessary to the performance of the utilitarian function of
the article,’ then the article is conceptually separable.” Spina, supra note 31, at 244 n.41.
130. Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1010 (2017).
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was not a utilitarian part of the useful article.131 But this analysis arguably
confuses courts because it is unclear what analytical tools are to be used
in deciding whether the work of art can exist apart from the useful article’s
utilitarian aspects. In other words, by rejecting previous tests relating to
functionality, Star Athletica left courts to grapple with how to make
principled distinctions between the work of art and the useful article’s
functionality.
These cases together shed light on how courts are responding to the
role of functionality in the separability analysis after Star Athletica. In
Jetmax, the court went out of its way to highlight the irrelevancy of the
fact that the function of the light changed when the decorative piece was
removed.132 That case is a signal that courts are struggling with the tests
specifically rejected by Star Athletica that emphasize the functionality of
the useful article. Ross further highlights this problem with Star Athletica’s
reasoning. The court in that case was not willing to recognize copyright
protection of the look and feel of a drawing of a handheld device because
all parts of the drawing were necessary to the functionality of a handheld
device.133 While that case concluded that the artistic part of the drawing
could not be imagined separately from the useful article itself, it reveals
that courts may still grapple with the functionality as a part of the
separability analysis and even rely on previous tests in the analysis. This
is not surprising given that separability is an exception to the general rule
that useful articles, as functional objects, are not intended to be protected
through copyright. Therefore, these two cases show that Star Athletica’s
reasoning lacks guidance regarding the role that functionality plays in
whether the expressive element is a utilitarian part of the useful article.
IV. RESOLVING CONFUSION AND OVERPROTECTION
A. Amend the Copyright Act
Star Athletica’s new test has fundamental problems. Its ambiguity
allows for overprotection of useful articles and, most importantly, it lacks
the analytical structure that courts need for the already difficult
separability analysis. Star Athletica rejected the tests applied by the lower
courts that were not grounded in the text of the statute, especially those
tests analyzing the functionality of the useful article after the expressive
element was removed.134 However, a complete banishment of the previous
131. Id.
132. Jetmax Ltd. v. Big Lots, Inc., No. 15-cv-9597 (KBF), 2017 WL 3726756, at *6 n.2
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2017).
133. Ross, 741 F. App’x at 734.
134. See generally Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. 1002.
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tests is confusing, especially because it is unclear what role functionality,
as an analytical tool, is supposed to play in copyright protection for useful
articles. This confusion is reflected in challenges the lower courts have had
integrating functionality into a separability analysis after Star Athletica.
And Star Athletica’s new test offers no additional or useful guidance
because it focused solely on the abstract language of the Copyright Act.
An appropriate way to resolve these issues is to bring the prior tests
back into the fold. Because the Court has already spoken through Star
Athletica, a petition for Congress to change the analysis might be the next
logical step. It is important to consider the incentives for Congress to
amend the separability language if petitioned to do so.
First, if Congress still intends to not grant broad copyright protection
for fashion designs, it should consider changing this analysis. Clothing
designs can be protected through design patents even when the design is
not separable from the utility of clothing.135 However, the fashion industry
has pushed for broadened copyright protection in its designs because
design patents last only fifteen years136 and copyrights can last much
longer.137 Congress has been hesitant to give broad copyright protection to
fashion designs, and has declined to adopt broader protection on many
occasions.138 But the broader separability analysis would allow for more
copyrightable designs for fashion companies.139 If the Congressional
intent of not allowing clothing designs to be copyrightable remains, Star
Athletica’s broadened protection for these designs is a persuasive reason
for Congress to amend the statute.
Another significant reason for Congress to amend the Act is the
possible national—and even international—market effect that a broad
separability analysis could create. The separability analysis could have
great market impacts for the clothing industry.140 Fashion companies are
likely to bring more suits against alleged copiers after Star Athletica.141
These suits would attempt to suppress the copying industry in fashion,
135. Id. at 1034–35 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (first citing 35 U.S.C §§ 71, 173 (2012); and then
citing Mark P. McKenna & Katherine J. Strandburg, Progress and Competition in Design, 17 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 1, 48–51 (2013)).
136. 35 U.S.C. § 173 (2012).
137. See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2012) (e.g., the copyrights to work after 1978 of known authors last
for the life of the authors, plus seventy years after their death).
138. See Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1034 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (collecting various sources on
this point and stating that “[c]ourts must respect those lines and not grant copyright protection where
Congress has decided not to do so. And it is clear that Congress has not extended broad copyright
protection to the fashion design industry”).
139. See id. at 1034–35.
140. Levi, supra note 115, at 709 (noting the possible downhill effects of fashion companies
aggregating many copyrights to their designs).
141. See, e.g., Puma Files Patent, Copyright, Trade Dress Suit, supra note 117.
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where other companies appropriate distinguishable parts of the fashion
designs to use in their clothing.142 The active attempt at destruction of the
copying industry could produce disruption in this large market, which sells
high-end designs at lower prices to more people.143 While the extent of
these impacts is obviously unclear, the possibility of disruption in an
industry that “in the United States alone encompasses nearly $370 billion
in annual spending and 1.8 million jobs”144 should give an additional,
compelling reason for Congress to amend the statute. To be clear, this Note
does not support the copying industry; instead, I am merely identifying a
real consequence of the separability analysis that provides a convincing
reason for Congress to amend the statute.
But the most important reason for Congress to amend the statute is
because Star Athletica’s test lacks analytical structure. Prior to Star
Athletica, many tests attempted to provide normative substance to
separability to best effectuate Congress’s intent through the abstract
separability language in the Copyright Act.145 These tests, while paying
heed to the statutory language, went beyond the statute and looked to the
history of separability as well as the broader policies of copyright for the
best possible test.146 Star Athletica brought separability back to the abstract
point from which courts were confused in the first place, resulting in the
overprotection of useful articles’ functional elements—likely unintended
by the original statute.147 Thus, it appears that Congress should intervene
because courts are forced to again grapple with abstract statutory language
without reliance on any old tests or outside policies for aid.
If Congress were to amend the statute, it would not be working with
a blank slate in terms of substance. Instead, Congress should find
normative guidance through the lower court tests prior to Star Athletica.
In particular, in light of the issues functionality has posed to court’s
142. See C. Scott Hemphill & Jeannie Suk, The Law, Culture, and Economics of Fashion, 61
STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1172 (2009); Nia Porter, Are High-Fashion Copies Actually Legal?, RACKED
(Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.racked.com/2016/8/18/12428004/fast-fashion-copy-sites-legal-knockoff [https://perma.cc/Y54H-YPNZ]. For more on why designers want to stop the copying industry, see
Eric Wilson, A Marriage of Economic Convenience, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/17/fashion/designer-retailer-union-remains-lucrative.html
[https://perma.cc/SDY3-HUM3].
143. Richard Boudreaux, In Italy, It’s Survival of the Fakest, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2000),
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2000-oct-06-cl-32027-story.html [https://perma.cc/ZK8EU3U2].
144. Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1035 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing U.S. CONGRESS, JOINT
ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, THE NEW ECONOMY OF FASHION 1 (2016), https://www.jec.
senate.gov/public/_cache/files/01498736-4605-4715-a894-4a04f65b01fc/the-new-economy-offashion——joint-economic-committee-final-lp-.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NUG-Z48J]).
145. Spina, supra note 31, at 244 n.41.
146. Id.
147. Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1002; Levi, supra note 115, at 709.
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analyses, the tests and cases speaking directly to functionality as a
meaningful part of separability would be particularly useful.148 Courts are
in need of a principled way to determine whether the work of art is a
utilitarian aspect of the useful article. The previous tests provide Congress
with a few options that go beyond the text of the statute as it is currently
written to provide a workable analysis for such a determination.149 Adding
functionality back into the analysis should also be augmented by the test
rejected by Star Athletica that considered the marketability of the useful
article to address any possible concerns of market impact noted above.150
Congress will need to address these two items in particular if it decides to
amend the statute, and it has a variety of options to provide the most clarity
and guidance for courts in the separability analysis. A petition for such an
amendment might be the last resort to clear up the ambiguity of the
separability analysis, and the prior tests provide at least some legitimate
launching point for the discussion.

148. These are the tests that involve some level of functionality within the separability analysis:
(2) the primary-subsidiary approach, which states that conceptual separability exists “if the
artistic features of the design are ‘primary’ to the ‘subsidiary utilitarian function,’” (quoting
Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir. 1980)); (3) the
objectively necessary approach, which provides that “if the artistic features of the design
are not necessary to the performance of the utilitarian function of the article,” then the
article is conceptually separable . . . (5) the design-process approach, which provides for
conceptual separability if the design elements reflect the “designer’s artistic judgment
exercised independently of functional influences,” (quoting Brandir Int’l, Inc., v. Cascade
Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1145 (2d Cir. 1987)); (6) the stand-alone approach, which
provides for conceptual separability if “the useful article’s functionality remain[s] intact
once the copyrightable material is separated,” (quoting Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene
Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 934 (7th Cir. 2004) (Kanne, J., dissenting)) . . . (8) Patry’s
approach, which asks whether designs are “separable from the ‘utilitarian aspects’ of the
article,” rather than the article itself, satisfying separability if the discernable PGS features
are “capable of existing as intangible features independent of the utilitarian aspects of the
useful article,” and are not “dictated by the form or function of the utilitarian aspects of the
useful article,” (quoting 2 William F. Patry, Patry on Copyright § 3:146 (2015)); and (9)
the subjective-objective approach, which determines separability by balancing the extent
“to which the designer’s subjective process is motivated by aesthetic concerns [and the
extent] to which the design . . . is objectively dictated by [the article’s] utilitarian
function,” (quoting Barton R. Keyes, Note, Alive and Well: The (Still) Ongoing Debate
Surrounding Conceptual Separability in American Copyright Law, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 109,
141 (2008)).
Spina, supra note 31, at 244 n.41.
149. Id.
150. This is the test that approaches separability with the market in mind:
(7) the likelihood-of-marketability approach, which states that conceptual separability
exists when, “even if the article ha[s] no utilitarian use it would still be marketable to some
significant segment of the community simply because of its aesthetic qualities.” (quoting
Galiano v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 416 F.3d 411, 419 (5th Cir. 2005)).
Id.
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B. Thin Copyright
If the Star Athletica test remains unchanged by Congress, then the
best solution is for courts to provide thinner copyright protection for a
work of art as the separability analysis becomes more difficult (i.e., as it
becomes more difficult to separate the work of art from the useful article).
In general, thin copyright is a term that relates to the amount of copying
of a certain work that will be actionable.151 Usually, when a court applies
thin copyright protection, it provides lesser protection to a work seeking
copyright protection because the work is made up of primarily
unprotectable parts.152 The result of thin copyright protection is that it
effects the infringement analysis by requiring a greater amount of
similarity between the original and infringing works before the copying is
considered improper appropriation.153 In essence, this means that the
“thinner” the copyright protection that a court applies, the more “virtually
identical” the infringing work must be to the copyrightable material.154
Applying thin copyright protection makes a copyright infringement claim
more difficult for the author of the original work, as less kinds of copying
of the copyrighted material will be actionable. The aspects of thin
copyright that can address the overprotection of works makes thin
copyright the appropriate analytical tool to address the concerns that the
new separability analysis leads to overprotection of functional elements of
useful articles.
Some commentators like Professor Levi have argued that applying
limiting doctrines to the broad separability analysis— such as thin
copyright—might be insufficient due to the overall anti-competitive
impact of the aggregation of copyrights in the fashion industry.155 But the
same motivations behind applying thin copyrights in other scenarios—to
provide reduced protection to works that contain less copyrightable
material—also apply to the new separability analysis.156 In addition to
limiting overprotection by preventing useful articles from passing through
both a low bar of separability and originality, the application of thin
copyright protection is reasonable on its own terms.
As previously mentioned, the decision to apply thin copyright
protection is associated with the infringement component of a copyright
infringement claim. In other words, this decision would occur once the
151 See Balganesh, supra note 39, at 223.
152. Id.; see also JANE C. GINSBURG & ROBERT A. GORMAN, COPYRIGHT LAW 30–32 (2012).
153. LEAFFER, supra note 35, at 412–14.
154. Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits Inc., 323 F.3d 763, 766 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that the thin
copyright doctrine provides protection only for copying that is “virtually identical”).
155. Levi, supra note 115, at 749.
156. Balganesh, supra note 39, at 209.
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work of art incorporated into the useful article meets the new separability
test and is copyrightable. Once an author shows that an infringer factually
copied the protectable elements of the work,157 they must also show that
the copying amounted to improper appropriation.158 A court will determine
that copying constituted improper appropriation by looking at the
similarity or substantial similarity between the two works,159 and there are
various infringement tests that articulate when certain copying is
improper.160 But there can also be an additional layer within this analysis;
a court can vary the level of scrutiny it uses to compare the works and
ultimately decide whether copying amounts to improper infringement.161
This variation can be referred to as thickness and thinness: “The thicker
the entitlement, the greater the forms and types of copying that are likely
to be actionable; conversely, the thinner the entitlement, the fewer the
forms and types of copying that are considered actionable.”162
In the context of thin copyright and infringement, Feist Publications
v. Rural Telephone Service Co. is the leading case and provides a good
example.163 The Court in Feist used the words thin copyright to describe
the point at which compilations of facts can obtain copyright protection.164
While the facts themselves would not be copyrightable, arrangements of
facts might have the minimal level of originality for those specific
arrangements to be protected.165 The Court explained:
This inevitably means that the copyright in a factual compilation is
thin. Notwithstanding a valid copyright, a subsequent compiler
remains free to use the facts contained in another’s publication to aid
in preparing a competing work, so long as the competing work does
not feature the same . . . arrangement.166

157. LEAFFER, supra note 35, at 407–12; Balganesh, supra note 39, at 207.
158. LEAFFER, supra note 35, at 412.
159. Id.
160. See MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 412–25 (4th ed. 2005) for
the various tests for infringement, including the “virtual identity” test that will be discussed later in
this section.
161. Balganesh, supra note 39, at 207.
162. Id. For more on the terminology of thin and thick copyright, see Jeffrey L. Harrison,
Rationalizing the Allocative/Distributive Relationship in Copyright, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 853, 859
n.42, 884–87 (2004); Lydia Pallas Loren, The Pope’s Copyright? Aligning Incentives with Reality by
Using Creative Motivation to Shape Copyright Protection, 69 LA. L. REV. 1, 30 (2008); Eric Setliff,
Copyright and Industrial Design: An “Alternative Design” Alternative, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 49,
77 (2006).
163. See generally Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991).
164. Terry S. Kogan, How Photographs Infringe, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 353, 398 (2017).
165. Id.
166. Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 349.
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Professor Ginsburg explained that the amount of copyright
protection afforded to works under the thin copyright doctrine is
“[v]irtually none, short of extensive verbatim copying.”167
A decision to apply thick or thin copyright protection turns on the
extent to which the copyrighted work is in line with the overarching
policies of copyright.168 Thus, works that serve “copyright’s primary
purpose only marginally” receive only thin copyright protection.169
Originality appears as a focal copyright policy involved in the decision to
apply thin copyright protection, as it is often described as “the sine qua
non of copyright.”170 While the amount of creativity needed for a work to
be original is low,171 the creativity and authorship required for a work to
be original are at the center of a significant copyright policy: to incentivize
creativity.172 Thus, given that originality represents an important policy
incentive in copyright, the choice of when to apply thin copyright
protections sometimes turns on the level of creativity embodied in the
work: “Many copyrights represent significant creative effort, and are
therefore reasonably robust, whereas others reflect only scant creativity.
The Supreme Court labels the latter ‘thin.’”173
If a work of art is less creative, and therefore less original, it normally
follows that the amount of the work that is copyrightable also decreases.174
The lack of copyrightable material can trigger thin copyright protection
because there is simply less of the work that can be protected.175
Accordingly, a work that is made “primarily of unprotectable material”
usually only gets thin copyright protection to ensure that protection is not
haphazardly extended to other parts undeserving of protection.176 The
underlying rationale of applying thin copyright to works composed of
primarily unprotectable material demonstrates why thin copyright
protection should generally be applied to useful articles. Useful articles
will always be partly comprised of uncopyrightable material because their
167. Jane C. Ginsburg, No “Sweat”? Copyright and Other Protection of Works of Information
after Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 338, 349 (1992); see also Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits
Inc., 323 F.3d 763, 766 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that the thin copyright doctrine provides protection
only for copying that is “virtually identical”).
168. Balganesh, supra note 39, at 209.
169. Id.
170. Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 345; see also David E. Shipley, Thin but Not Anorexic:
Copyright Protection for Compilations and Other Fact Works, 15 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 91, 95 (2007).
171. Shipley, supra note 170, at 95.
172. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison).
173. 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A][4] (2019)
(footnote omitted).
174. See generally Kevin J. Hickey, Reframing Similarity Analysis in Copyright, 93 WASH. U.
L. REV. 681 (2016).
175. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 173, § 13.03[A][4].
176. Balganesh, supra note 39, at 223.
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functional elements do not receive copyright protection.177 It follows that,
while the work of art may possess a high level of creativity, it is still
conveyed within a work containing many functional, uncopyrightable
elements. The separability analysis is supposed to remove the
copyrightable material from the uncopyrightable aspects of the useful
article. But the separability analysis is now so easy to meet that it no longer
can be depended upon to satisfactorily separate the copyrightable material
(the work of art) from the uncopyrightable material (the utilitarian aspects
of the useful article). The only bar is originality. Thus, in terms of the thin
copyright’s policy considerations, courts should apply thin copyright
protection to works of art incorporated into useful articles in the following
way: the more difficult it is to separate the expressive part of the article
from its unprotectable, functional elements, the thinner the copyright
protection the court should apply in its final analysis.178

177. See Jonathan M. Barnett et al., The Fashion Lottery: Cooperative Innovation in Stochastic
Markets, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 159, 166 (2010); see also Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc.,
137 S. Ct. 1002, 1009 (2017).
178. Here is a visual of what the new analysis would look like:
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This “thin separability” approach would allow for flexibility. It
would offer protection to designs incorporated into useful articles in cases
like Mazer where Congress intended to extend copyright protection. But
most importantly, such a test would offer a normative mechanism that
courts can use to limit the overprotection of functional elements of useful
articles after Star Athletica. The separability analysis no longer provides
an appropriate limit to the overprotection of functional elements of useful
articles. By restricting the amount of copying that will be improper, thin
separability is a reasonable response to concerns that the new separability
analysis leaves only originality as a limit to the overprotection of
functional elements of useful articles. If a court decides to apply thin
copyright, the original author will win in an infringement case only if the
copier has copied the work of art in a way that creates a virtually identical
copy of the original. At the same time, as a design becomes more clearly
separable from the useful article, the test provides courts with the
flexibility to require something less than virtually identical copying. Thin
separability is the proper step for courts given the principles and policies
of copyright if the legislature remains unwilling to act.
CONCLUSION
The new separability standard of Star Athletica is insufficient
because it utilizes the abstract language of the statute. The cases surveyed
in this Note give inklings as to the issues that courts will face in the future
if the test remains unchanged. Issues exist both with how courts struggle
to make sense of the standard and with the way the test is applied.
Thin copyright protection could take pressure off of courts trying to
limit and make sense of the new and broad separability. A petition to
Congress to amend the statute is another viable option. If Congress
decided to amend the statute, it could use the prior separability tests as the
baseline for a new standard. While total clarity of separability seems like
a lofty goal, this Note strives to provide the appropriate angles by which
courts and lawmakers might think about solving the problem.

